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DANGEROUS LIAISONS: ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE, THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION, ABA
MODEL RULE 1.6 AND POST-SEPTEMBER 11
COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES"

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of attorney-client privilege in American
jurisprudence furthers the policies of the adversarial system by
promoting clients' full disclosure in communications with their
lawyers, so that they may receive appropriate and skilled legal
advice.1 Historically, its application has been circumscribed and
subject to exceptions,2 because it conflicts with policies favoring
complete disclosure. 3 One exception to attorney-client privilege
is the crime-fraud exception. The exception vitiates the
privilege if the relationship that created the privilege was
"fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued."" In applying
the crime-fraud exception, courts have fashioned its boundaries
and set the evidentiary thresholds a party must meet to prevail
in a crime-fraud challenge to privilege. The resultant judicial
determinations create a patchwork of standards that tend to
forge the crime-fraud exception into a sword of intrusiveness,
rather than a shield of public policy.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") promulgated the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5 as the basis for many
state professional codes. Model Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of

2

©2002 Geraldine Gauthier. All Rights Reserved.
See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).

3 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
4 Clark, 289 U.S. at 14. "The privilege takes as its postulate a genuine

relation, honestly created and honestly maintained. If that condition is not satisfied...
the relation is merely a sham and a pretense. . . ." Id.
5 MODEL RULES OF PROFIL CONDUCT (2002).
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Information, contains a crime-fraud exception to attorneyclient privilege that permits lawyers to disclose client
confidences under certain circumstances. 6 In August 2001, the
ABA House of Delegates debated proposals to broaden the
crime-fraud exception and the scope of permissible attorney
disclosure under Model Rule 1.6.' The ABA Ethics 2000
Commission, which worked on the proposed revisions, said
Rule 1.6 was "out of step with public policy and the values of
the legal profession as reflected in the rules currently in force
in most jurisdictions. " " Thus, the professional ethics
environment that existed prior to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States was imbued with the
perception that the disclosure rules were outdated and out of
line with public policy favoring less protection for attorneyclient confidences. 9
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Department of
Justice published a regulation amending administrative
measures used by the Bureau of Prisons to protect classified
and sensitive information from disclosure by prisoners. 10 The
new regulation allows the U.S. Attorney General to monitor the
attorney-client
communications
of suspected
terrorist
prisoners, when he has "reasonable suspicion" that an inmate
may use communications with an attorney to facilitate terrorist
acts." Explaining the need for this new regulation, the
Attorney General reported to Congress that a confiscated Al
Qaeda training manual counsels imprisoned terrorists to
communicate with terrorists who are still at large, 2 and
characterizes
the practice of concealing such messages as an
13
"art.

In Parts II and III, this Note traces the development of
the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege in the
6

Id. at R. 1.6.

MODEL RULES OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6 (Reporter's Explanation of
Changes 2001).
7

8

Id.

9 See id.
10

National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R.

§ 501.3 (2001).
11 Id.
DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(testimony of U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/testimony.cfm?id=121&wit-id=42 (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
13 Id.
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federal courts and discusses the inconsistencies in the
evidentiary thresholds used to invoke the exception. In Part IV,
this Note reviews the crime-fraud exception to disclosure of
client confidences contained in the revised ABA Model Rule 1.6,
Confidentiality of Information, and the effect of lawyer ethics
on attorney-client privilege. Part V examines the recent U.S.
Justice Department regulation allowing federal authorities to
monitor attorney-client communications to prevent acts of
terrorism. This Part concludes that the Justice Department's
regulation aptly illustrates application of the crime-fraud
exception, as the ABA Model Rule and the federal courts
defined it, despite outcries by the ABA and others to the
contrary. Finally, this Note proposes ways to develop a
consistent standard for applying the crime-fraud exception,
which is needed to preserve the attorney-client privilege in the
face of offensive incursions upon it by the judiciary and
professional ethics codes.
I.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE

IS

INHERENTLY

PROSCRIBED

The doctrine of attorney-client privilege dates back to
the English courts in the early 1500s. 14 The modern
formulation protects communications between lawyers and
their clients that are made in the context of supplying legal
advice,1 5 provided the privilege is not waived and the
communications are not related to the ongoing or future
commission of a crime.16 The privilege works as an exception to
14

8

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COMMON LAW

§

2290

(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
"Where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion
whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of business advice, it is not
privileged." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950).
16 The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as
a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding and not (d) for
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358. Wright & Miller's treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notes
another well-known formulation of the basic privilege is by Judge
Sugarman: "[W]here legal advice of any kind is sought from a
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evidence disclosure requirements. 17 Since it "operates to
withhold relevant information from the fact finder," it is to be
used sparingly.'8 To invoke attorney-client privilege, a party
must demonstrate that: (i) the communication was between
client and counsel; (ii) the communication was confidential; and
(iii) the communication was made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice. 19
II.

THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION

The Supreme Court first addressed the crime-fraud
exception to privileges in Clark v. United States.20 The specific
issue in Clark was the scope of the privilege attached to jury
deliberations. 21 The Court reasoned that once a juror is sworn,
she becomes a court officer.2 As such, she is subject to the same
punishment for contempt that would be imposed upon an
attorney for deception or concealment.2 Although the Court's
discussion of attorney-client privilege is dictum, Clark is
frequently cited for its articulation of the crime-fraud exception
to attorney-client privilege 7 '
In Clark, the defendant served on a jury in a federal
criminal trial and cast the only vote for acquittal.25 She was
charged with obstruction of justice for intentionally concealing
her former employment with the defendant, and for falsely
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, the communications
relevant to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his
instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the
legal advisor except the protection be waived."
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2017 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting Wonneman v. Stratford Secs. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
17 John Doe Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
18 In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 1980).
19 United States v. Const. Prods. Research, 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996).
20
21

289 U.S. 1 (1933).

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.

23

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989). The New Jersey
Supreme Court characterized Clark's 1933 discussion of the crime-fraud exception as
"reflect[ing] the uniform current legal opinion, here and elsewhere, and [is] based on
sound considerations of public policy.... In fact, to our knowledge, no other standards
are in force elsewhere." In re Selser, 105 A.2d 395, 399-400 (N.J. 1954). Nearly seventy
years after Clark, the Restatement of Law Governing Law, citing Clark, said the crimefraud exception to attorney-client privilege "is uniformly recognized by courts and
commentators in evidence codes." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW:
CLIENT CRIME OR FRAUD § 82 cmt. b (1998).
25 Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
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stating that she was "free from bias. "26 She was convicted of
criminal contempt and sentenced.' On appeal, she argued that
the admission of her fellow jurors' testimony regarding her
conduct during deliberations violated the privilege attached to
jury deliberations and votes.' In dicta, the Supreme Court
responded that "the privilege does not apply where the relation
giving birth to it has been fraudulently- begun or fraudulently
continued."' The Court continued, "to drive the privilege away,
there must be 'something to give colour to the charge,' there
must be 'prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in
fact."' ° The prima facie showing "sufficient to satisfy the judge
1 was satisfied in Clark by a
that the light should be let in'3
showing that the defendant deliberately withheld information
in voir dire, and by her statement that she was "free from
bias. 3 2 While it may be reasonably inferred that the crimefraud exception in Clark was founded upon the totality of the
evidence, that is, both the verifiable concealment and the
subjective statement that she was "free from bias," the
determination of what constitutes a prima facie showing of
crime-fraud remains unsettled.13
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the crimefraud exception in 1989 in United States v. Zolin,3 a tax fraud
case involving privileged documents that the government
sought to discover. The case arose from an IRS investigation of
L. Ron Hubbard, head of the Church of Scientology (the
"Church").' The Church brought suit in Los Angeles Superior
Court against a former member, for stealing internal church
documents and materials. 6 The allegedly pilfered documents
and two audio tapes were filed under seal with the court. 37 The
IRS sought access to these materials in connection with its
investigation and served a summons upon Zolin, the superior
2
2
28

Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12-14.

' Id. at 14.
Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 (quoting O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581 (H.L.

30

1920)).
31

3

Id. at 15.
Id. at 10.
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 (1989).
491 U.S. 554.
Id. at 556.

36

Id. at 557.
37 Id.
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court clerk, who produced both the documents and the audio
tapes to the IRS.&
The Church intervened with a privilege claim, and the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued
a restraining order, directing the IRS to submit to the district
court all of the materials it had obtained by subpoena, pending
disposition of the Church's motion to enjoin the IRS from using
them. 9 The IRS complied with the district court's order except
as to the audio tapes.' It retained both the tapes and the notes
its agents made concerning them, and it petitioned for
enforcement of its summons. 4' The IRS supported its petition
with an agent's declaration asserting the relevance of the tapes
to the IRS investigation.4 Partial transcripts of the tapes were
appended to the declaration.' The IRS claimed it had legally
obtained the transcripts through a confidential source." The
district court denied the IRS's petition on grounds that the
tapes contained attorney-client communications, the Church
had not waived privilege, and the excerpts provided by the IRS
tended to show past fraud, but did not clearly indicate future
crime or fraud.'
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel
affirmed the district court's ruling, and held that evidence of
crime-fraud must be independent from the contested attorneyclient communications themselves.' The full court of appeals
vacated the panel opinion.4 7 It ordered en banc review in light
of a perceived conflict within the circuit on the issue of whether
evidence required to trigger the crime-fraud exception must be
independent
from
the
contested
attorney-client
communications."' Upon review, the Ninth Circuit decided that
the perceived conflict did not exist, and it reinstated the panel's
opinion.49 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
evidence used to make the case for crime-fraud exception
3
3

id.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 557-58.

40 Id. at 558.
41

Id.

4 Id.
43 Id.

44 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 558.
4 Id. at 559.

' Id. at 560-61.
47 Id. at 561.
4 Id.
4

Zolin, 491 U.S. at 561.
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applicability need not be independent from the privileged
communications themselves.50
The Supreme Court declined to address the evidentiary
showing required to defeat privilege, stating that, "we need not
decide the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish
the applicability of the crime-fraud exception."5 The Court
acknowledged a law review Note, 52 which pointed to the
inherent conflict in the prima facie evidence standard, because
ordinarily, the standard shifts the burden and allows the nondiscovering party to rebut.' In the crime-fraud context,
however, "the standard is used to dispel the privilege
altogether without affording the client an opportunity to
rebut .... ""' The Zolin court acknowledged this difficulty but
failed to resolve the inconsistency:
We note . . . that this Court's use in Clark v. United States of the
phrase "prima facie case" to describe the showing needed to defeat
In using the phrase in
the privilege has caused some confusion ....
Clark, the Court was aware of scholarly controversy concerning the
role of the judge in the decision of such preliminary questions of fact.
The quantum of proof needed to establish admissibility was then,
and remains, subject to question.... In light of the narrow question
presented here for review, this case is not the proper occasion to visit
these questions.M

The federal courts were thus left to develop the
standard for a requisite showing of crime-fraud sufficient to
trigger the exception.
A.

Divergent Standardsfor Applicability of the Crimefraud Exception

In federal courts, a mere allegation of crime or fraud is
insufficient to destroy attorney-client privilege.6 Zolin requires
'0

Id. at 574.

51 Id. at 563.

52 Susan F. Jennison, Comment, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege: Marc Rich and the Second Circuit, 51 BROOK L. REV. 913
(1985).

5

Id. at 918-19.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 565 (quoting Jennison, supra note 52, at 918-19).
Id. (citations omitted).
See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933) (noting that "[a] mere

charge of wrongdoing" is insufficient); Neuder v. Battelle, 194 F.R.D. 289, 298, (D. D.C.
2000) (noting that "mere allegations of wrongdoing" are insufficient); United States v.
Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that "mere allegations or suspicions
by government are insufficient"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th
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a two-part showing to invoke the crime-fraud exception: first,
"a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a
reasonable person that in camera review . . . may reveal
evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception
applies" 7 and second, an in camera review of the contested
communications to determine whether the exception should be
invoked.' The first step, "factual basis," can rest upon the
attorney-client communications themselves; 9 the evidence need
not be "independent.' 0 Under Zolin, the mere assertion of a
privilege claim does not cause a "presumptive privilege" to
automatically attach to communications between attorneys and
their clients.6 '
In practical effect, the prima facie showing
contemplated by Zolin creates a broad net to cast upon the
ocean of circumstances that arise in the context of crime-fraud
exception litigation. A prima facie showing is the minimum
evidentiary showing which, if not rebutted, is sufficient to
prevent judgment as a matter of law. 62 But the Zolin standard
lends little predictability to what evidence may or may not be
considered a crime-fraud showing sufficient to overcome
attorney-client privilege.

Cir. 1996) (reasoning "it is not enough for government merely to allege that it has
sneaking suspicion"); In re Richard Roe, 68 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a
finding of "relevance" does not demonstrate crime-fraud and therefore does not trigger
exception); Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 790 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting
that "mere allegations of fraud ... are not sufficient"); Coleman v. American Broad.
Co., 106 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that "more is necessary than mere
allegations of wrongdoing"); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d. 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1939)
(noting that "a mere assertion of an intended crime or fraud is not enough") (citations
omitted).
r7Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted).
8

Id.

Id. at 575 ("[We hold that the threshold showing to obtain in camera
review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not
been adjudicated to be privileged.").
Id. at 574 ("We conclude that the party opposing the privilege
may use any
nonprivileged evidence in support of its request for in camera review, even if its
evidence is not 'independent' of the contested communications.").
61 Nor does it make sense to us to assume... that once the attorneyclient nature of the contested communications is established, those
communications must be treated as presumptively privileged for
evidentiary purposes until the privilege is 'defeated' or 'stripped away'
by proof that the communications took place in the course of planning
further crime or fraud.
Id. at 567.
BLACICS LAWDITIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999).
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The second step prescribed in Zolin, that in camera
review, "rests in the sound discretion of the district court 6 3 is
guided in part by factors that the Court said may be considered
by trial judges in exercising their discretion.6' But these factors
rely upon the individual approaches and concerns of the
judiciary, which may color discretion.'
In the Second Circuit, the standard of proof required to
override the privilege is a showing of "probable cause to believe
that a crime or fraud ha[s] been committed and that the
communications were in furtherance thereof.' Once probable
cause is shown, the trial judge may exercise discretion to decide
whether to conduct an in camera review.67 The Second Circuit's
"first step" presents a higher hurdle for the discovering party
than does Zolin's "first step," because Zolin merely required a
showing that in camera review may reveal evidence that the
crime-fraud exception applies.'
In In re Richard Roe, 69 the Second Circuit examined the
"in furtherance" requirement in its crime-fraud jurisprudence.
6 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
64 [The facts and circumstances of the particular case ...the volume
of materials . . . the relative importance to the case of the alleged
privileged information, and the likelihood that the evidence produced
through in camera review, together with other available evidence then
before the court, will establish that the crime-fraud exception does
apply.
Id. at 572.
See, e.g., the views of Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York: "I start from the principle that everything in
court should be public and nothing secret except the internal chambers discussions....
Each case is different, but in general, where there is a doubt, secrecy should be
rejected." Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, IX J. L. &
POLY 53, 53, 65, (2000). See also the opinion of Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the District of
New Jersey: "[Diespite some rising pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the king of
concealment and disinformation." Haines v. Liggett Group, 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D. N.J.
1992). Judge Sarokin, upon review of the magistrate's crime-fraud ruling on privileged
documents, considered facts not in evidence before the magistrate. The Third Circuit
vacated his opinion for this reason and said the district court was not "anointed with
such authority" and that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review should have been
applied. The Third Circuit concluded that "the appearance of impartiality will be
served only if an assignment to another judge is made" and it removed Sarokin from
the case. Haines v. Liggett Group, 975 F.2d 81, 93-94, 98 (3d Cir. 1992).
In re John Doe v. United States, 13 F.3d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court'
explained, "This standard has been rephrased as requiring 'that a prudent person have
a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime or
fraud, and that the communications were in furtherance thereof.'" Id. at 637.
67United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1997). This mirrors
the
"second step" in Zolin.
68Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
6 68 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1995).
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The court explored the difference between the "relevant
evidence" and the "in furtherance" tests for application of the
crime-fraud exception.7 ° It reasoned that if the crime-fraud
exception could attach to privileged materials merely because
they provide evidence of a crime, the privilege would be
"virtually worthless" because a client could never discuss
anything with counsel that might support a finding of guilt.7'
The crime-fraud exception, it decided, can therefore only apply
when the communication itself was "in furtherance" of a crime
or fraud, i.e., when it was intended to facilitate or conceal the
criminal activity,72 and if the "requisite purposeful nexus" was
shown.7 3
Zolin, in contrast, does not incorporate the "in
furtherance" requirement. Under Zolin, the threshold showing
sufficient to trigger an in camera review "may be met by using
any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been
adjudicated to be privileged."74 Indeed, in Zolin, the matter
came before the Court on an affidavit of an IRS agent who
merely "stated his grounds for believing that the tapes were
relevant to the investigation."7 5 Under Zolin, courts do not
apply the "in furtherance" requirement at the first step.
Rather, the trial judge makes such a finding after conducting
the in camera review. 7' The Supreme Court acknowledged that
the "first step" evidentiary threshold it set is less than the
showing required to defeat privilege by requiring only "a
factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a
reasonable person."77 The Court's acknowledgment is justified
in view of the standard's inherent ambiguities, i.e., the
measure of "adequate," and the definitions of "good faith" and
"reasonable person."
Post-Zolin, some circuits struggled with the standard
for satisfying the burden of proof required to "de-privilege"
70 Id. at
71

40.

Id.

72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpeona Duces Tecum,
731 F.2d 1032 (2d

Cir. 1984)).
74 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 575.
75 Id. at 558.
76 This may be inferred from the Court's discussion that attorney-client

communications need not be treated as "presumptively privileged" just because
privilege has not yet been overcome by proof that they were made in furtherance of a
future criminal or fraudulent act. Id. at 567.
Id. at 572. This threshold step is, however, sufficient to initiate
an in
camera review.
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attorney-client
communications
under the crime-fraud
7
exception. A prime example is In re Sealed Case,79 an action
that arose in the D.C. Circuit from a grand jury investigation
into whether a corporation violated federal election laws. The
privileged matters at issue were a company vice president's
testimony about his meeting with general counsel concerning
campaign finance law, his subsequent memorandum reflecting
communications during the meeting, and a related
memorandum written by general counsel to outside counsel.'
The company asserted the attorney-client privilege with
respect to these materials. The district court did not rule on the
question and the circuit court assumed that the privilege
applied.8' Although the appellate courts cannot review matters
left undecided by a trial court, the D.C. Circuit Court's
presumption of privilege in In re Sealed Case represents a
significant departure from Zolin, in which the Supreme Court
expressly declined to treat the disputed communications as
"presumptively privileged."8 2
As to the nature of the burden proof required to trigger
the crime-fraud exception, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that
the "prima facie case" formulation established in Clark leads to
confusion since it normally shifts the burden to the other party,
whereas in the crime-fraud context, the burden is clearly on the
party seeking to pierce privilege."' In deciding this case, the
court "encounter[ed] some confusion" over whether "the level of
proof, is a 'prima facie showing' a preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or something else." 4 It
noted that "Zolin left the standard of proof question for another
78 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000);
In re

Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Davis, 852 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1993).
79 107 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
80 Id. at 48.
81 Id. The D.C. Circuit said, "Since the district court has yet to pass
on this
question, we will assume the Company is correct." Id.
"2 [It] does [not] make sense . .. that once the attorney-client nature
of the contested communications is established, those communications
must be treated as presumptively privileged for evidentiary purposes
until the privilege is "defeated" or "stripped away" by proof that the
communications took place in the course of planning future crime or
fraud.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 567.
83 In re Sealed Case, 107 F. 3d at 49-50. The same acknowledgement was
made by the Supreme Court in Zolin, 491 U.S. at 565 n.7 (citing Jennison, supra note
52, at 918-19).
84 In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 49-50.
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day."8 Following its own precedent, the D.C. Circuit held that
the burden would be satisfied by evidence which, "if believed by
the trier of fact would establish elements of ongoing or
imminent crime or fraud."8
The D.C. Circuit also departed from Zolin when it ruled
that the government did not meet its burden of showing crime
fraud by merely establishing that a company officer had
committed an illegal act. 87 The court said that to' establish
crime-fraud, the government must show that the company
itself sought legal advice for the purpose of furthering illegal
acts. It held that "[sihowing temporal proximity between the
communication and a crime is not enough." In Zolin, the
Supreme Court pierced the privilege claimed by the Church on
the temporally proximate basis of an IRS investigation of the
individual tax returns of a Church leader. 9
In civil cases, the Third Circuit follows Zolin's threshold
standard that triggers in camera review and gives discretion to
the district court judge to conduct it.' But before the in camera
review is conducted, a hearing is held to afford both sides the
opportunity to present their arguments and evidence. 91 In
Third Circuit criminal cases, however, the applicability of the
crime-fraud exception can be determined by the district court
on the basis of ex parte government affidavits to avoid
"minitrials" before grand juries. 92
In Impounded,o the Third Circuit recognized that it
"may be salutary and efficacious to safeguard the attorney"Id.
87

Id. Accord, In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 50.

88Id.

89 United

States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
Haines v. Ligett Group, 975 F.2d 81, 96 (3d Cir. 1992).
91 Deciding whether the crime-fraud exception applies
is another
matter. If the party seeking to apply the exception has made its initial
showing, then a more formal procedure is required than that entitling
plaintiff to in camera review. The importance of the privilege, as we
have discussed, as well as fundamental concepts of due process require
that the party defending the privilege be given the opportunity to be
heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking an exception
to the privilege. We are concerned that the privilege be given adequate
protection, and this can be assured only when the district court
undertakes a thorough consideration of the issue, with the assistance of
counsel on both sides of the dispute.
Id. at 96-97 (citation omitted).
92 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 218 (3d
Cir. 2000).
241 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2001).
90
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client privilege" to require a discovering party to demonstrate
that it cannot obtain the evidence it seeks except through
disclosure of privileged materials,9
and that "[u]nder
appropriate circumstances, it may well constitute the better
practice."9 The court, however, said it had no authority to
justify such a requirement.9
The Fifth Circuit requires evidence of intent as part of
the prima facie showing of crime-fraud. In Industrial
Clearinghouse v. Browning, the court found that a prima facie
showing of crime-fraud was satisfied by "evidence of an intent
to deceive."9 Defendant Browning initiated a malpractice suit
against its former attorneys and retained new counsel to
represent it in its dispute with the plaintiff, Industrial
Clearinghouse.9 Industrial Clearinghouse sought production of
Browning's communications with its former counsel, arguing
that the defendant's filing of the malpractice suit was a waiver
of privilege, or, alternatively, that the defendant used its
relationship with its former counsel to further criminal activity
and, therefore, the crime-fraud exception should apply.9 The
case came before the Fifth Circuit on Browning's interlocutory
appeal from the district court's order granting plaintiffs motion
to compel production on the ground that privilege was
waived.1l° The Fifth Circuit reversed on the waiver issue01 On
the crime-fraud question, the court found that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in finding that the defendant's
alleged misrepresentations were unintentional. 2 The court
held that "[a] party must present evidence of an intent to
deceive to establish a prima facie case of fraud or peijury." °3
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's ruling is consistent with the "in
furtherance" test observed by the Second Circuit and others,'
' Id. at 315.
9 Id.
9 Id.

953 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1006.

9

9 Id.
1" Id. at 1005.

101Id. at 1007.

102 Indus. Clearinghouse,953
103

F.2d at 1008.

Id.

104 The

"infurtherance" showing is also required by the First Circuit, United
States v. Reeder, 170 F.3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 1999); Third Circuit, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 217; Eighth Circuit, Rabushka v. Crane, 122 F.3d 559, 566 (8th
Cir. 1997); Ninth Circuit, United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996);
and Tenth Circuit, Motley v. MarathonOil, 71 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995).
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if actions cannot be taken "in furtherance" of a crime or fraud
in the absence of intent.10'
In United States v. Davis,"' the Seventh Circuit declined
to overrule its pre-Zolin decision defining what constitutes a
prima facie case for triggering the crime-fraud exception.' °7 The
08 arose from
pre-Zolin case, In the Matter of Michael Feldberg,1
a grand jury investigation of a sports agent. In response to a
subpoena, the agent produced fifty-one athletes' contracts. In
response to a second request, he produced six contracts.' 09 The
prosecutor brought an obstruction of justice charge for the
agent's failure to produce all of the contracts at one time, and
sought testimony from the agent's attorney as to how the agent
compiled the initial group of contracts for production. 10 The
court said:
The language "primafacie evidence" has suggested to some courts
enough to support a verdict in favor of the person making the claim.
We are not among them ....
The question here is not whether the
evidence supports a verdict but whether it calls for inquiry ....
[A]
prima facie case must be defined with regard to its function: to
require the adverse party, the one with superior access to the
evidence and in the best position to explain things, to come forward
with that explanation."'

The court reasoned that the agent's retention of
suspicious contracts was probably not a random omission, since
the contracts were active business documents which should
have been readily available, and because the subpoena clearly
called for them." Citing Clark,11 the court said the obstruction
charge had a factual foundation because "the circumstances
106The First Circuit stands at variance, for although it espouses the "in

furtherance" language, it may not actually require any showing of intent since a client
need only "reasonably should have known" that the subject matter of the attorney
consultation was a crime or fraud. In other words, it would appear that intent may be

inferred from negligence. Reeder, 170 F.3d at 106 (holding that the attorney-client
privilege is overcome by the crime-fraud exception "where the client sought the services
of the lawyer to enable or aid the client to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime of fraud") (quoting United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1,

4 (1st Cir. 1998)).

lo6 1 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1993).
106

Id. at 609.
852 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1988).

1"6

Id. at 623.

107

11 Id. at 623-24.
" Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
112

Id. at 625.

"3 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
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give color to the charge "114 and thus, the circumstances
amounted to prima facie evidence of crime-fraud sufficient to
trigger the exception.
United States v. Davis presented a nearly identical
factual scenario to Feldberg-agrand jury subpoena, an initial
production of documents, a subsequent production, and an
obstruction of justice charge."' With respect to whether the
prima facie evidence standard had been met, the court again
quoted Clark,"6 and referred to the defendant's failure at the
outset to make a complete production: "All that is needed is
something 'to give color to the charge'... [wihether pale or rich
or vivid, there is indubitably color here." 7
Accordingly, in the Seventh Circuit, the burden to make
a prima facie case sufficient to trigger the crime-fraud
exception is higher than the Zolin standard, because it requires
a discovering party to have a plausible, supportable theory of
crime-fraud before privileged communications can be subject to
review.118 Zolin allows review of privileged communications
with a mere showing that the communications may" 9 assist the
discovering party to show that the crime-fraud exception is
applicable.' 20
The Ninth Circuit requires moving parties to show a
relationship between the attorney-client communications and
the crime or fraud, and that the communications were "in
furtherance" of the crime or fraud. 2' In United States v. Chen,
the court articulated the standard as "reasonable cause to
believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance
of the ongoing unlawful scheme."'2 But the court went further
to define "reasonable cause" as "more than a suspicion but less
than a preponderance of evidence." This definition confuses
the evidentiary construct, since the preponderance standard
cannot come to bear in the context of an ex parte submission.
In the Tenth Circuit, a crime-fraud challenge to
privilege requires a prima facie showing that "attorney
Feldberg,862 F.2d at 625.
Davis, 1 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 Clark, 289 U.S. at 15.
117 Davis, 1 F.3d at 610 (citing Clark, 289 U.S. at 15).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
119 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989).
120 Id.
114
1

1

12

United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id

23 Id.
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participation in crime or fraud has some foundation in fact."' u
In Motley v. Marathon Oil, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's decision to terminate her employment was made
for "[equal employment opportunity] reasons." 1' The plaintiff
sought production of two documents: a memorandum prepared
by defendant's legal department containing guidelines for
terminations and employee lists prepared at the legal
department's request to assist it in advising the committee
handling the terminations. 12 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged
that the plaintiff offered "evidence of race-based decisions by
Marathon when it carried out the reduction in [work] force,"
but said this was insufficient to show that the documents were
prepared in furtherance of a crime or fraudY27 In Zolin, the
Supreme Court never reached the question of attorney
participation in the crime or fraud, and the Tenth Circuit's
decision is at odds with other jurisdictions holding that an
attorney's innocence in the alleged crime-fraud has no bearing
upon disclosure of the documents. 12
The lower federal courts have also applied standards of
crime-fraud exception applicability that are at variance with
Zolin. Most notably, the Northern District of California and the
District of Kansas both ruled that the discovering party must
use
evidence
independent
of
the
attorney-client
communications it seeks.'2
State court rulings contribute to the troublesome
inconsistencies in crime-fraud litigation. A Michigan Court of
Appeal1' o and a New Jersey Superior Court 3 ' enunciated the
"independent evidence" standard rejected in Zolin. 32 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court discussed Zolin's failure to set a
"level of showing" for a prima facie case and concluded that it
Motley v. Marathon Oil, 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that poor-performing minority
employees whose names were on "termination lists" prepared by the company, were
removed from those lists and their names replaced by non-minority employees, to avoid
racial discrimination claims. Id. at 1550.
'u

12

Id. at 1550.

Id. at 1551.
See, e.g., Chen, 99 F.3d at 1499; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F. 3d
748 (4th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1527 (N.D. Cal. 1991);
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 167 F.R.D. 134, 141-42 (D. Kan. 1996).
130 People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Mich. App. 1994).
"'

13 Nat'l Util. Serv. v. Sunshine Biscuits, 694 A.2d 319, 324 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1997).
m United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574 (1989).
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would establish the preponderance standard,1 3 without any
discussion of the problems associated with applying a
preponderance standard in the context of an ex parte
proceeding." Connecticut adopted the Second Circuit's "in
furtherance" standard in Olson v. Accessory Controls.' In
Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. Watson," the Virginia Supreme
Court held that an answer to an interrogatory filed in a Texas
case, which was inconsistent with information contained in a
privileged document in the Virginia litigation, was a showing of
fraud sufficient to overcome privilege. 137 In State v. Fodor,3 8 the
Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege will only be applied upon
a prima facie showing that a client retained counsel for the
express purpose of promoting or continuing a criminal or
fraudulent act.1
The Zolin Court declined to decide the "quantum of
proof' required to defeat privilege.' 4 Hence, post-Zolin, the
lower courts have adopted their own varying standards of
proof. These disparate standards, coupled with the element of
judicial discretion, 4 give rise to a discordant body of
admissible evidence that injects randomness into challenging
and defending attorney-client privilege. Moreover, crime-fraud
disclosures part the protective cloak that the doctrine of
attorney-client privilege afforded parties for centuries."1m The
effect of an uncertain evidentiary standard is vexatious enough
by itself. It is even more disquieting in view of Zolin, which
significantly eroded attorney-client privilege protection in
holding that evidence of crime-fraud need not be independent
of the attorney-client communications at issue." This allows a
party who is unable to independently put forward a "factual
basis to support a good faith belief,"1 4 to trigger inspection of
privileged documents to assist it in making its crime-fraud
133 Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1997).
134 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54, 123.

A.2d 14, 30-31 (Conn. 2000).
413 S.E.2d 630 (Va. 1992).

13757
13

LV Id. at 638-39.
880 P.2d 662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
15Id.

140 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 (1989).
141 See supra note 65.
142 See supra text accompanying note 14.
143 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574.

I" Id. at 572.
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showing. The pre-Zolin law of the Ninth Circuit did not allow
indiscriminate forays through privileged communications
unless the discovering party had some reasonable basis for
alleging crime-fraud at the outset. 145 The Zolin court carved a
further inroad into the attorney-client privilege doctrine by
refusing to treat the attorney-client communications as
"presumptively privileged," despite the lower court's finding
that
they
contained
confidential
attorney-client
communications and that privilege had not been waived.'46
III.

PROFESSIONAL DISCLOSURE RULES

Against this background of decreasing judicial
protection, 147 in 1997, the ABA established the "Ethics 2000
Commission" to evaluate what the it called a "patchwork
pattern of state regulation." 1" The Commission reviewed the
Model Rule governing lawyer disclosures against developments
in the law since the last revision of the Model Rules in 1983.149
The 1983 version of Model Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of
Information, permitted attorneys to disclose client confidences
where necessary to "prevent clients from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." "° In 2001, the ABA Ethics
Commission recommended permitting attorneys to disclose
client wrongdoings "involving substantial economic harm to
others." 5' Although the ABA House of Delegates did not
approve this proposal,15 2 nothing prevents individual states

145

Id.

146

Id. at 559.

147

See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.

'4
E. Norman Veasey, Chair's Introduction and Executive Summary to ABA
Ethics Commission Final Report (2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
149 Margaret Colgate Love, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
Final ReportSummary of Recommendations (June 9, 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlove-article.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
1W"(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm...."MODELRULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.6 (1983).
161Love, supra note 149.
152 Delegates opposed to the rule argued that
it would "turn [lawyers] into
'compliance officers' forced to police, prosecute and judge their clients." Molly
McDonough, Caution is the Keynote at ABA Gathering, NAVrL L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at
A15.
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from adopting it into their own professional codes.'5 The ABA
Delegates did, however, approve an expansion of the language
of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), 154 which broadens the rule to permit
disclosure of client confidences even when the possibility of
harm is not immediate and when the potential act is not
criminal. 55 This revision now defines permissible disclosure as
that needed "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm."" The word "imminent" was replaced with
"reasonably certain" to allow disclosure of client confidences if
there is a threat of future injury. 57 The Ethics Commission
Reporter acknowledged that client confidences may now be
breached with no requirement of client criminality.'5
163

University of Pennsylvania law professor Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,

an Ethics 2000 member who served as chief reporter when the ABA
revamped its rules 20 years ago, said that he wouldn't be surprised if
states ignore the delegates and adopt Ethics 2000 recommendations.
That's what he says happened in 1983, the last time delegates were
asked to expand permissive disclosure rules.
Id. at Al, A15. The professional codes of several states already allow disclosure of
crimes or frauds that can cause substantial financial injury. See, e.g., Alaska, ALASKA
RULES OF PROFlL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1999), available at http://www.state.ak.uscourtsprof.htm#1.6 (last visited Aug. 10, 2002); Arizona, ARIZ. RULES OF PROVIL CONDUCT ER
1.6 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2002); Georgia, GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2001), available at http://www.gabar.org/grpcl6.htm (last updated Oct. 2001); Maryland, MD. RULES OF PROL
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/links.html (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002); New Jersey, N.J. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT RPC 1.6
(2001), available at http://njlawnet.com/nj-rpctrpcl-6.html (last modified July 14, 2002);
Ohio, OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1970), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/professional (last modified July 2, 2001).
164 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CTR FOR PROFIL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT 401 (Feb.
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-redline.html (last visited Aug. 15,
2002).
156 Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged
toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to
the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person
who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating
disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat
or reduce the number of victims.
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CTR FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY: PROPOSED RULE 1.6 (Feb.
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.html (last visited Aug. 15,
2002).
1W MODEL RULES OF PROVIL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
157The Commission Reporter explained that this revision was made "to
include a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such injury at a later
date, as in some instances involving toxic torts." MODEL RULES OF PROVL CONDUCT R.
1.6 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes 2001). Thus the revision thrusts lawyers into
the role of expert witnesses, to evaluate, for example, the effects of a particular
pollutant.
158 "The Commission recommends that the exception currently recognized
for
client crimes threatening imminent death or substantial bodily harm be replaced with
a broader exception for disclosures to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
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Like the Zolin standard for piercing attorney-client
privilege,5 9 the Model Rule standard rests the ultimate
determination of whether a client confidence will be revealed
upon judicial discretion. 1' Although the ABA Model Rules are
merely that, models for state professional codes, most state
codes contain a crime-fraud exception to their confidentiality
rules patterned upon162the ABA rule. 16 ' A few states mandate
disclosure of a crime.
IV.

POST-SEPTEMBER

11 COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES

The revised Model Rule and the trends in crime-fraud
litigation point to public policy favoring fuller disclosure of
client confidences in the crime-fraud context, existing before
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
In fact, the ABA Ethics Commission's proposal to broaden
lawyer disclosure was made in recognition of the fact that
many jurisdictions had already adopted such positions. 16 In
camera inspections had been increasingly used in the federal
courts,'6 allowing the judiciary to rummage, at its discretion,
bodily harm, with no requirement of client criminality." Id.
159See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
160The 1983 Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) allowed lawyers to "reveal such information
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary: (1) to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm .... " MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983)
(emphasis added). The revised rule provides that disclosure is permissible "to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (emphasis added).
161Roger C. Cramton, The Duty of Confidentiality, A.B.A. J., May 2001, at 60.
16 See, e.g., the professional codes of Arizona, ARIZ. RULES OF
PROF'L
CONDUCT ER 1.6 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002); Florida, FLA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (2002), available at
http://www.flabar.org/tfbtemplates.nsflnewwebsite?openframeset&frame=content&src=
/tfb/flabarwe.nsf/f6301f4d554d40a385256a4f006e6566/af8929180e6de08585256b2fo06c
5375?OpenDocument (last modified Apr. 25, 2002); N.J. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT RPC 1.6 (1998), available at http://njlawnet.com/nj-rpc/rpcl-6.html (last
modified May 14, 2002); Texas, TEX. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.05 (1989),
available at http://www.txethics.org/reference-rules.asp?view=conduct&num= 1.05 (last
visited Aug. 10, 2002); Virginia, VA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), available
at http://www.vsb.org/profguides/rules.pdf; and Vermont, VT. RULES OF PROIVL
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1999), available at http://www.vtbar.org/courts&LawRelatedResources/VTRulesOfProf.ConductTableOfContents.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
163 "[T]he Commission agrees with the substantial criticism that has been
directed at current Rule 1.6 and regards the Rule as out of step with public policy and
the values of the legal profession as reflected in the rules currently in force in most
jurisdictions." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Reporter's Explanation of
Changes 2001).
164 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (5th ed. 1999).
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through attorney-client communications. Yet despite this
apparent acquiescence to relaxation of attorney-client privilege,
when the U.S. Justice Department decided to allow monitoring
of suspected terrorist prisoners' communications with their
lawyers," the ABA criticized the new regulation as violating
attorney-client
privilege.'6
The
Justice
Department's
regulation, however, does not trammel privilege any more than
the federal courts' crime-fraud exception standards, nor more
than permissive disclosure under ABA Model Rule 1.6.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Bureau of Prisons published a regulation allowing suspected
terrorist prisoners' communications with their attorneys to be
monitored, to deter terrorist acts. 167 In testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft said that an Al Qaeda terrorist training manual
instructs imprisoned terrorists to "exploit [the American]
judicial process" and to "communicate with brothers outside
prison and exchange information that may be helpful to them
in their work."16 Ashcroft warned that the manual adds, "[tihe
importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is
self-evident here."169 The Justice Department, concerned that
imprisoned terrorist suspects might use communications with
their attorneys to further terrorist conspiracies, amended the
Bureau of Prisons' rule on management of inmates who pose a
potential threat to national security. 70 The new rule allows the
Attorney General to monitor such inmates' attorney-client
communications if he has "reasonable suspicion" that such
communications may be used to facilitate terrorist acts.7 1
The measure operates as follows. First, on the basis of
information from a law enforcement or intelligence agency
head that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a
165

National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R.

§ 501.3 (2001).
166 Statement of Robert E. Hirshon, President, American Bar Association,
Nov. 9, 2001, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/justice-department.html (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002).
167 28 C.F.R. § 501.3.
168 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(testimony
of U.S.
Attorney
General
John
Ashcroft),
available at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/testimony.cfm?id=121&wit-id=42
(last visited Aug.
15, 2002).
169 Id.
17028 C.F.R. § 501.3.
171 Id.
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particular inmate may use communications with attorneys or
their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism," the
Attorney General may order the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons to monitor attorney-client communications. 172 Then,the
Bureau of Prisons must give notice to the prisoner, and to his
17
or her counsel, that communications may be monitored.
Thereafter, communications are monitored by a "privilege
team" comprised of individuals who have no role in, or relation
to, investigating the prisoner. 174 Upon the privilege team's
determination that a particular communication indicates an
imminent act of violence or terrorism, that communication may
be disclosed to law enforcement authorities.17 Except for the
information indicating imminent threats, no other information
gleaned from the monitoring may be disclosed '76 or used for any
or other purpose 177 without approval by a federal
investigative
178
judge.
The regulation illustrates how the judicial and ABA
disclosure standards for attorney-client privileges in the
context of crime-fraud are applied. First, the Attorney
General's standard to invoke monitoring 179 is nearly identical to
the ABA Model Rule 1.6 standard for an attorney's
discretionary disclosure of a client confidence." ° The Justice
Department's standard differs from Rule 1.6 by its inclusion of
the "substantial damage to property" provision, but that
provision in effect mirrors the ABA Ethics Commission's
proposed "economic injury" revision to the Model Rule. 18' The
1" Id. §

501.3(a).

'7' Id. § 501.3(b).
174 Id. § 501.3(d)(3).
175 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3)
176 Id.
177DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(testimony of Assistant U.S. Attorney General Viet D. Dinh), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/testimony.cfm?id=128&wit-id=78 (last visited Aug.

10, 2002).

178Id. See also 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).
179 The standard exists to deter acts "that could result in death or serious

bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of
death or serious bodily injury to persons." 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a).
180 Lawyers may "reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm .... " MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (2002).
"" The ABA Ethics Commission recommended this language in the proposed
revision: "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary .. .to prevent the
client from committing a crime or fraud reasonably certain to result in substantial
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Justice Department's standard is more cautious than the
Model Rule because it requires that disclosure decisions be
made by a team of monitors.1 82 The Model Rule allows
a single
s3
disclose.
to
decision
discretionary
a
make
to
lawyer
The Justice Department regulation allows monitoring
only upon "reasonable suspicion" that the prisoner poses a
potential national security threat.84 "Reasonable suspicion" is
based on intelligence information received from the head of a
law enforcement or intelligence agency. ls In contrast, a
lawyer's "reasonable belief" that his or her client might commit
a criminal act that will cause "reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm""s need not derive from law
enforcement or intelligence information. For example,
"reasonable suspicion" could be based on a client's statement
that "next time I get drunk, I've got a mind to go beat the tar
out of my brother-in-law, and I'm going out drinking tonight."1 87
The counter-terrorist regulation also embodies the
standard set by the federal courts, in that, a mere charge of
wrongdoing cannot trigger the crime-fraud exception, s In the
context of the regulation, mere detention as a terrorist suspect
will not trigger monitoring.'89 Instead, a reasonable suspicion

based on intelligence or law enforcement information must
exist. ' 9° The regulation operates in a similar manner to judicial
in camera inspections, by preventing disclosure of privileged
communications that do not indicate an imminent threat,
without the review and approval of a federal judge.'91
The regulation also tracks the course of permissible
disclosure under both the ABA rule and the judicially applied
crime-fraud exception. For example, the Model Rule will allow
an attorney to disclose a client's bomb threat.' But privileged
communications indicating future criminal activity with no
imminent threat to human life or limb, such as an announced
financial injury... ." Love, supra note 149.
18228 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).
Ms'MODEL RULES OF PROIVL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1).
184 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
185 Id.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1).
187See infra text accompanying note 215.
186

188See supra note 56.
18928 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
190 Id.

19128 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).
192 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6.
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intention to obtain a falsified passport, would be subject to
judicial review. 19
The notice requirement in the monitoring regulation
may be a greater safeguard of attorney-client confidences than
either the ABA Model Rule or the federal courts, since neither
requires that an attorney put a client on notice that certain
confidences may be disclosed." The Justice Department
regulation offers further protections by allowing the prisoner to
seek review of the monitoring through the Bureau of Prisons'
Administrative Remedy Program,'95 and by setting time limits
on the monitoring." In contrast, the ABA Model Rule affords a
client no such right.'
A lawyer's disclosure of a client
confidence moots any review of the decision to disclose.
Similarly, the litigant defending crime-fraud exception
application has no "review opportunity," and rarely even
receives an opportunity to rebut a discovering party's prima
facie evidence of crime-fraud."
Thus the "deeply troubl[ing]" 9 "frontal assault on the
attorney-client privilege"" that the ABA and the American
Civil Liberties Union ascribed to the Justice Department's
regulation, stems less from the regulation than from the
threats posed by the federal courts and the ABA Model Rule.
The courts pay verbal homage to attorney-client privilege as
the "oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law""' and, along with the ABA,
recognize the "centrality of open client and attorney
communication to the proper functioning of our adversary
system of justice." °0 But action is necessary to preserve the
doctrine.
193 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989).
194 MODEL RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 1.6.
19 66
' 28

Fed. Reg. 55,062.
C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

MODEL RULES OF PROIL CONDUCT R. 1.6.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
19 Statement of Robert E. Hirshon, President, American Bar Association,
19

Nov. 9, 2001, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/justice-department.html (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002).
Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union et al., Regarding
Eavesdropping on Confidential Attorney-Client Communications, Dec. 20, 2001, at
http://www.aclu.org/safeandfree/122001_comments.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
201 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981).
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). See also, Amendments to
Ethics 2000 Commission Report 401, August 30, 2001, noting that a lawyer's
preservation of client confidences "contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the
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THE ADMINISTRATION
STANDARD

OF

JUSTICE-A

PROPOSED

To achieve uniformity, to observe due process and to
protect the attorney-client privilege when it is warranted, a
rational scheme for judicial application of the crime-fraud
exception to privilege is required. Ironically, the courts have
already fashioned appropriate standards; the problem lies in
the lack of unified guidelines.
By grafting together the various standards already set
down by the courts, a workable, post-Zolin standard emerges.
This post-Zolin standard contains six elements. (1) The mere
assertion of crime or fraud is insufficient to trigger the crime
fraud exception.m (2) Only attorney-client communications that
are "in furtherance" of crime or fraud trigger the exception, not
those that are merely "relevant" to the crime or fraud.'
Alternatively, intentional deception must be shown. 2 5 (3) The
attorney-client communications at issue must have a
reasonable relationship to an alleged current or ongoing crime
or fraud.' The privilege is not vitiated merely because the
client has committed a crime or a fraudo or because the client
communicated with counsel while engaged or involved in an
alleged crime or fraud." Rather, the exception applies only
upon a showing of probable cause to believe that
communications with counsel were intended to facilitate or
conceal such wrongdoing." (4) The discovering party must
demonstrate that it has no alternative means of obtaining the
evidence.2 1 ° (5) Whenever reasonably possible, the trial courts
should allow the party asserting privilege an opportunity to be
heard, rather than relying on ex parte submissions and
proceedings.21 ' Finally, (6) a sufficient showing of crime-fraud
client-lawyer relationship," at http://www.abanet.ort/cpr/32k-complete-amend.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
See supra note 56.
M4 United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997); In
re Richard Roe, 68
F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1995).
Either "[s]omething to give colour to the charge" of crime-fraud, Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); or "evidence of an intent to deceive." Indus.
Clearinghouse v. Browning Mfg., 953 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1992).
2W Burton v. R. J. Reynolds, 177 F.R.D 491 (D. Kan. 1997).
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon, 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974).
Maloney v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 165 F.R.D. 26 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
2W Id.
210 Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2001).
21 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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will not remove all attorney-client communications from
privilege, but only those with a purposeful nexus to fraud.212
The ABA can more aggressively protect client
confidences by authoring commentary to accompany Model
Rule 1.6 to guide lawyers faced with making discretionary
decisions on whether to disclose information adverse to a
client. 21' The state of Virginia, for example, recognizes that it is
"very difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when proposed criminal
conduct will be actually carried out, for the client may have a
change of mind."214
Another difficulty arising from the exercise of discretion
involves defining what constitutes "reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm."2 15 In the hypothetical brother-in-law
scenario described above, if the brother-in-law sustains a
broken nose and facial lacerations in the context of an assault
and battery by the client, those injuries might constitute
"substantial bodily harm." Yet the same injuries resulting from
an automobile accident would likely be labeled "minor." The
scenario is further complicated if the brother-in-law ducks to
avoid the punch and in doing so, loses his balance, hits his
head on the hardwood floor and sustains irreversible brain
damage.
Instructive commentaries would assist lawyers to
determine when to make a discretionary disclosure of a client
confidence.
The
following
supplemental
commentary,
constructed from the existing professional codes of individual
states, provides such assistance. (1) Disclosure of client
confidences is appropriate when the lawyer possesses
knowledge that a client intends to commit a crime and the
lawyer has the information needed to prevent the crime.1 6 (2)
In instances where the attorney does not possess evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, disclosure may be permitted if the
212
213

Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
The ABA provided this comment as a guide to lawyers' exercise of

discretion with the 1983 Model Rule: "The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires
consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client
and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the
transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question." MODEL RULES OF
PROVL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (1983). The comment was deleted from the new rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROleL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
214 VA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.
13 (2000), available at
http://www.vsb.org/profguides/rules.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
215MODEL RULES OF PROI L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002).
216 OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(3) (2001), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rules/professional (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
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lawyer has a "reasonable belief' that the client intends to
commit a crime. A "reasonable belief' means that the lawyer
believes it, and the circumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable.2 17 (3) Disclosure of confidential information is
necessary to prevent the crime.1 8 (4) The lawyer's failure to
take preventive disclosure measures may aid the client in
committing illegal action.219 (5) The interest in preventing the
harm
outweighs
the
interest in
preserving client
confidentiality.2 ° (6) The disclosure should be no greater than
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose."
Using the brother-in-law hypothetical, a lawyer would
have sufficient information of intention to commit a crime as
well as the information needed to prevent it, if the client
identifies his brother-in-law by name or address and adds some
particulars to the threat, such as brandishing a set of "brass
knuckles" or identifying a specific place or time for the attack.
A "reasonable belief' might be based on the lawyer's knowledge
of his client's previous assault on his brother-in-law or others,
or the client's enraged issuance of so detailed a threat that it
constitutes an actual plan for the crime. Even under these
circumstances, the lawyer faces a difficult judgment call on
discretionary disclosure, because the client may simply be
venting his frustrations in a setting he believes to be
confidential. In this instance, it is almost impossible for the
lawyer to know whether disclosure to prevent harm outweighs
the interest in preserving client confidences. Nonetheless, the
adoption of commentary to amplify the obligations to clients
and to third parties in the crime-fraud context would assist
lawyers in weighing the factors involved in making decisions
regarding their discretionary disclosure of client confidences.
217ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ER 1.6 cmt. 13 (1998), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002); PENN. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 13 (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
218MASS. RULES OF PROIVL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (2001), available at
http://www.state.ma.us/obcbbo/rpcnet.htm (last modified Dec. 1, 2000).
219 MICH. RULES OF PROWL CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 12 (2001), available at http://-

www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics (last modified Apr. 2002).
= UTAH RULES OF PROV1L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 9 (2001), available at http://www.utahbar.org/rules/html/professional conduct.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
221 VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2000), available at
http://www.vsb.org/profguides/rules.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2002). Commentary to the
former ABA Model Rule 1.6 provided for this limitation to disclosure MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (1983), but the new rule deleted this comment. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
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CONCLUSION

There is a dangerous tendency, albeit justifiably
motivated, to level the playing field on which crime or fraud is
committed by ordering fuller disclosure of attorney-client
privileged communications. Nevertheless, as the Justice
Department's September 11 regulations demonstrate, fuller
disclosure presents a difficult problem of how to balance
policies favoring disclosure against the safeguards required to
protect the adversarial process upon which the justice system
is based. Affirmative steps such as those proposed above must
be taken to ensure attorney-client privilege protection, because
the current environment threatens to transform this critically
important doctrine in American jurisprudence into a
discretionary application.
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